网络安全 Analyzing Windows Shellbag Artifacts

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网络安全Claude Opus 4.7安全审计AnalyzingWindows

Analyzing Windows Shellbag Artifacts：网络安全 skill: analyzing-windows-shellbag-artifacts，适用于安全分析、取证与威胁排查场景。

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Skill Documentation

网络安全 Analyzing Windows Shellbag Artifacts

摘要

Analyzing Windows Shellbag Artifacts：网络安全 skill: analyzing-windows-shellbag-artifacts，适用于安全分析、取证与威胁排查场景。

> 来源: mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills (18k stars) — 网络安全专业技能集

> 原文件: skills/analyzing-windows-shellbag-artifacts/SKILL.md

> 模型推荐: claude-opus-4-7 (安全分析深度推理)

这个 skill 是干嘛的

mukul975 整理的 100+ 个网络安全专业 skill — 覆盖渗透测试 / 取证 / 威胁情报 / 合规审计 / 云安全 / 移动安全等领域。每个 skill 对应一个具体的安全分析任务。

michael 强调"skill 要有相应的指导功能,指导用户使用",所以加了下面两节让 Agent 和用户对接。

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🤖 Agent 使用说明

1. 用户提到"分析 X 日志 / 取证 / 检测威胁 / 渗透测试 / 安全审计"时触发对应 skill

2. skill 按操作步骤执行(取证镜像 / 解析日志 / 跑威胁情报)

3. 涉及破坏性操作前必须 ask user 确认

4. 完工后跑自检

5. 区分"防御性分析" vs "恶意代码审计"

👤 用户需要做什么?

1. 告诉 Agent 你要做什么(分析日志 / 取证 / 安全审计 / 渗透测试)

2. 按 Agent 提示提供文件/镜像/日志/哈希

3. 涉及破坏性操作时明确告诉 Agent"继续"或"取消"

4. 全程 Agent 自动化,你只需提供数据 + 回答决策点

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原 skill 内容(mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/skills/analyzing-windows-shellbag-artifacts/SKILL.md,截断到 12k chars)

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name: analyzing-windows-shellbag-artifacts

description: Analyze Windows Shellbag (BagMRU) registry artifacts with SBECmd and

Shellbags Explorer to reconstruct folder browsing activity and prove user interaction

with directories, including removable media and network shares, even after the

folders are deleted. Use when reconstructing a user's folder access history or

proving access to a since-removed directory in DFIR work.

domain: cybersecurity

subdomain: digital-forensics

tags:

shellbags
windows-registry
sbecmd
shellbags-explorer
folder-access
user-activity
removable-media
network-shares
bagmru
dfir

version: '1.0'

author: mahipal

license: Apache-2.0

nist_csf:

RS.AN-03
DE.AE-02
RS.MA-01

mitre_attack:

T1083
T1074.001
T1135
T1025
T1070.004

---

Analyzing Windows Shellbag Artifacts

Overview

Shellbags are Windows registry artifacts that track how users interact with folders through Windows Explorer, storing view settings such as icon size, window position, sort order, and view mode. From a forensic perspective, Shellbags provide definitive evidence of folder access -- even folders that no longer exist on the system. When a user browses to a folder via Windows Explorer, the Open/Save dialog, or the Control Panel, a Shellbag entry is created or updated in the user's registry hive. These entries persist after folder deletion, drive disconnection, and even across user profile resets, making them invaluable for proving that a user navigated to specific directories on local drives, USB devices, network shares, or zip archives.

When to Use

When investigating security incidents that require analyzing windows shellbag artifacts
When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques

Prerequisites

Familiarity with digital forensics concepts and tools
Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution
Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed
Appropriate authorization for any testing activities

Registry Locations

Windows 7/8/10/11

| Hive | Key Path | Stores |

|------|---------|--------|

| NTUSER.DAT | Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRU | Folder hierarchy tree |

| NTUSER.DAT | Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Bags | View settings per folder |

| UsrClass.dat | Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRU | Desktop/Explorer shell |

| UsrClass.dat | Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Bags | Additional view settings |

BagMRU Structure

The BagMRU key contains a hierarchical tree of numbered subkeys representing the directory structure. Each subkey value contains a Shell Item (SHITEMID) binary blob encoding the folder identity:

**Root (BagMRU)**: Desktop namespace root
**BagMRU\0**: Typically "My Computer"
**BagMRU\0\0**: First drive (e.g., C:)
**BagMRU\0\0\0**: First subfolder on C:

Each Shell Item contains:

Item type (folder, drive, network, zip, control panel)
Short name (8.3 format)
Long name (Unicode)
Creation/modification timestamps
MFT entry/sequence for NTFS folders

Analysis with EZ Tools

SBECmd (Command Line)

# Parse shellbags from a directory of registry hives
SBECmd.exe -d "C:\Evidence\Registry" --csv C:\Output --csvf shellbags.csv

# Parse from a live system (requires admin)
SBECmd.exe --live --csv C:\Output --csvf live_shellbags.csv

# Key output columns:
# AbsolutePath - Full reconstructed path
# CreatedOn - When the folder was first browsed
# ModifiedOn - When view settings were last changed
# AccessedOn - Last access timestamp
# ShellType - Type of shell item (Directory, Drive, Network, etc.)
# Value - Raw shell item data

ShellBags Explorer (GUI)

# Launch GUI tool for interactive analysis
ShellBagsExplorer.exe

# Load registry hives: File > Load Hive
# Navigate the tree structure to see folder hierarchy
# Right-click entries for detailed shell item properties

Forensic Investigation Scenarios

Proving USB Device Browsing

Shellbag Path: My Computer\E:\Confidential\Project_Files
ShellType: Directory (on removable volume)
CreatedOn: 2025-03-15 09:30:00 UTC

This proves the user navigated to E:\Confidential\Project_Files
via Windows Explorer, even if the USB drive is no longer connected.
The volume letter E: and directory timestamps can be correlated
with USBSTOR and MountPoints2 registry entries.

Detecting Network Share Access

Shellbag Path: \\FileServer01\Finance\Q4_Reports
ShellType: Network Location
AccessedOn: 2025-02-20 14:15:00 UTC

This proves the user browsed to a network share, even if
the share has been decommissioned or access revoked.

Identifying Deleted Folder Knowledge

Shellbag Path: C:\Users\suspect\Documents\Exfiltration_Staging
ShellType: Directory
CreatedOn: 2025-01-10 08:00:00 UTC

Even though C:\Users\suspect\Documents\Exfiltration_Staging
no longer exists, the Shellbag entry proves the user
created and navigated to this folder.

Limitations

Shellbags only record folder-level interactions, not individual file access
Only created through Windows Explorer shell and Open/Save dialogs
Command-line access (cmd, PowerShell) does not generate Shellbag entries
Programmatic file access via APIs does not generate Shellbag entries
Timestamps may reflect view setting changes, not necessarily folder access
Windows may batch-update Shellbag entries during Explorer shutdown

References

Shellbags Forensic Analysis 2025: https://www.cybertriage.com/blog/shellbags-forensic-analysis-2025/
SANS Shellbag Forensics: https://www.sans.org/blog/computer-forensic-artifacts-windows-7-shellbags
Magnet Forensics Shellbag Analysis: https://www.magnetforensics.com/blog/forensic-analysis-of-windows-shellbags/
ShellBags Explorer: https://ericzimmerman.github.io/

Example Output

$ SBECmd.exe -d "C:\Evidence\Users\jsmith" --csv /analysis/shellbag_output

SBECmd v2.1.0 - ShellBags Explorer (Command Line)
====================================================
Processing hives for user: jsmith
  NTUSER.DAT:  C:\Evidence\Users\jsmith\NTUSER.DAT
  UsrClass.dat: C:\Evidence\Users\jsmith\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat

[+] NTUSER.DAT shellbag entries:   456
[+] UsrClass.dat shellbag entries: 1,234
[+] Total shellbag entries:        1,690

--- Folder Access Timeline (Incident Window) ---
Last Accessed (UTC)     | Folder Path                                             | Type        | Access Count
------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------
2024-01-15 14:34:05     | C:\Users\jsmith\Downloads                               | File System | 45
2024-01-15 14:36:25     | C:\ProgramData\Updates                                  | File System | 3
2024-01-15 15:05:00     | \\FILESERV01\Finance                                    | Network     | 2
2024-01-15 15:12:30     | \\FILESERV01\Finance\Q4_Reports                          | Network     | 1
2024-01-15 15:30:00     | E:\                                                     | Removable   | 4
2024-01-15 15:30:45     | E:\Backup                                               | Removable   | 3
2024-01-15 15:31:20     | E:\Backup\Corporate_Data                                | Removable   | 2
2024-01-15 16:12:45     | \\FILESERV01\HR\Employees                                | Network     | 1
2024-01-15 16:15:00     | \\FILESERV01\HR\Employees\Records_2024                   | Network     | 1
2024-01-16 02:35:00     | C:\Windows\Temp                                         | File System | 5
2024-01-17 02:44:00     | C:\ProgramData\svc                                     | File System | 2
2024-01-18 01:10:00     | C:\Users\jsmith\AppData\Local\Temp                      | File System | 8

--- Network Share Access ---
  \\FILESERV01\Finance             First: 2023-09-10  Last: 2024-01-15
  \\FILESERV01\Finance\Q4_Reports  First: 2024-01-15  Last: 2024-01-15  (NEW)
  \\FILESERV01\HR\Employees        First: 2024-01-15  Last: 2024-01-15  (NEW)
  \\DC01\SYSVOL                    First: 2023-03-15  Last: 2024-01-16  (anomalous access time)

--- Removable Device Access ---
  E:\ (USB Drive)
    Volume Name:    BACKUP_DRIVE
    First Accessed: 2024-01-15 15:30:00 UTC
    Last Accessed:  2024-01-15 15:45:22 UTC
    Folders Browsed: 3 (E:\, E:\Backup, E:\Backup\Corporate_Data)

--- Deleted/No Longer Existing Paths ---
  C:\ProgramData\Updates\                (folder deleted, shellbag persists)
  C:\ProgramData\svc\                    (folder deleted, shellbag persists)
  C:\Windows\Temp\tools\                 (folder deleted, shellbag persists)

Summary:
  Total unique folders accessed:  1,690
  Network shares accessed:        4 (2 newly accessed during incident)
  Removable media:                1 USB device (data staging suspected)
  Deleted folder evidence:        3 paths (anti-forensics indicator)
  CSV exported to:                /analysis/shellbag_output/

常见问题（FAQ）

使用「Analyzing Wind」这个 skill 能解决什么问题?

本 skill 专注于Analyzing Wind，网络安全 skill: analyzing-windows-shellbag-artifacts。它将相关流程标准化，帮助用户更快拿到可靠结果，减少重复手工操作。

什么情况下适合使用「Analyzing Wind」?

当你需要在Analyzing Windows Shellbag Artifacts相关工作中获得稳定、可复用的产出时最适合——无论是单次任务还是纳入日常工作流，都能直接调用。

使用「Analyzing Wind」前需要准备什么?

需要明确授权范围内的目标系统或样本文件，并准备隔离的分析环境（虚拟机/沙箱）。

FAQ